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                       UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
            CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA - EASTERN DIVISION
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             HONORABLE JOHN W. HOLCOMB, U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE
 4
   ROSS CORNELL, et al.,
 5
                       Plaintiffs,
                                          ) Certified Transcript
 6
                                            Case No.
             VS.
 7
                                             5:22-cv-00789-JWH-SHK
    OFFICE OF THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY,
 8
    COUNTY OF RIVERSIDE, et al.,
 9
                       Defendants.
10
11
12
13
                   REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
                              MOTION HEARING
                           FRIDAY, JULY 8, 2022
14
                                 8:57 A.M.
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                           SANTA ANA, CALIFORNIA
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23
                     DEBBIE HINO-SPAAN, CSR 7953, CRR
                     FEDERAL OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER
24
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1	SANTA ANA, CALIFORNIA; FRIDAY, JULY 8, 2022
2	8:57 A.M.
3	
4	
08:57AM 5	THE COURTROOM DEPUTY: The Court calls Case
6	Number EDCV 22-00789-JWH(SHKx), Ross Cornell versus Office of
7	the District Attorney, County of Riverside.
8	Counsel, please state your appearances, first for
9	the plaintiff.
08:57AM 10	MR. DARNELL: Good morning, Your Honor. David
11	Darnell on behalf of plaintiffs. Also present is my colleague,
12	Mr. Gaurav Reddy.
13	THE COURT: All right. Good morning, Counsel.
14	MR. SMITH: Good morning, Your Honor. Doug Smith
08:58AM 15	for the County of Riverside/District Attorney.
16	THE COURT: And good morning, Mr. Smith.
17	MR. SMITH: Sir.
18	THE COURT: All right. We're here on plaintiff's
19	motion for preliminary injunction.
08:58AM 20	Did everyone receive my tentative?
21	MR. DARNELL: We did, Your Honor.
22	THE COURT: All right. So let me hear from
23	plaintiff's counsel first, being on the negative end of the
24	tentative as it were.
08:58AM 25	As I always say, when I issue a tentative, it's

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truly a tentative. If I had made a final decision, we wouldn't
       1
       2
          be here. I wouldn't waste your time. I wouldn't waste your
          clients' money.
       3
                     So feel free to poke holes in it. Tell me where
       4
          it's wrong. Tell me if there are errors of fact or law.
08:58AM
      5
          Please don't be shy about attacking it because that's -- I want
       6
       7
          to get it right, and I want to get to the truth. So let's do
       8
          it that way.
                     I do have some questions. But, Mr. Darnell, why
          don't I just -- why don't you start where you want to start and
08:59AM 10
     11
          tell me what you want to tell me, and then I think my questions
     12
          will arise kind of organically.
                     MR. DARNELL: Very good. May I use the podium?
     13
     14
                     THE COURT: Yes, please.
08:59AM 15
                     MR. DARNELL: Thank you, Your Honor. And thank you
     16
          for preparing the tentative. It was very helpful.
     17
                     Your Honor, I have a few points that I'd like to
     18
          address in the tentative. The primary issue, though, is that
     19
          the tentative is, obviously, based on abstention and the
08:59AM 20
          Younger doctrine or exceptions thereto, but it does not answer
     21
          the critical questions of whether the DA's prosecution
     22
          conflicts with federal law, more particularly, federal ADA law
     23
          as it relates to standing.
     24
                     Now, the Court, I assume, knows that the DA's views
          on ADA standing are at the core of the underlying prosecution.
09:00AM 25
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          In the criminal Complaint, the DA contends that the claims of
       2
          ADA standing in three underlying federal lawsuits were false or
          deceitful because Estrada "manufactured ADA violations" and
       3
          "did not have standing to sue." I'm quoting from the
       4
09:00AM
      5
          opposition at page 20. It's also listed there multiple --
       6
          excuse me -- multiple times.
       7
                     So the fundamental issue here is does Estrada have
          lawful standing under the ADA statute or not? There can only
       8
          be fraud or deceit if his claims about standing are false.
09:00AM 10
          That is the fundamental issue. And that ties into the critical
          analysis as it relates to the Younger exception for bad faith.
     11
     12
                     THE COURT: Let me follow up on that, if I may. I
          want to make sure I understand your argument here. Let's say
     13
     14
          that the criminal court in Riverside County agrees with your
09:01AM 15
          position and finds that Mr. Estrada did have standing -- does
     16
          have standing -- I guess did have standing to prosecute these
          three ADA cases. Could it not also be true that Mr. Estrada
     17
          made false statements in those three Complaints?
     18
     19
                     MR. DARNELL: No, Your Honor. I don't think it --
                     THE COURT: Okay. That's the piece that -- I don't
09:01AM 20
      21
          quite understand why that is the case.
                     MR. DARNELL: Because the fraud and the deceit here
      22
     23
          all goes to the issue of standing. The fraud is that he never
      24
          went to these facilities. Now, we now know the evidence before
09:01AM 25
          the Court in the reply that's at Docket 34-12. He did go.
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1
          There was a contemporaneous photograph of him with Corona
       2
          Animal Hospital right behind him, Your Honor. There's also
          photographs demonstrating that he encountered a first-access
       3
          barrier parking violation that violate the ADA requirements.
       4
09:02AM
      5
                     THE COURT: So is it the only -- the County, in
          making its assertion that there are false statements in the
       6
       7
          Complaints -- is it true that the only thing the County is
          pointing to is that Mr. Estrada was never there at these three
       8
          sites? Or aren't there other things that the County is
09:02AM 10
          pointing to as being false?
     11
                     MR. DARNELL: There's two things. The first thing
          is that he was never there. That's been disproven.
     12
                                                                The second
     13
          theory is the problem that we have with ADA law. The second
          theory of the ADA is that he had an improper motivation or he
      14
09:02AM 15
          didn't have a legitimate motivation to be there; that he did
     16
          not intend to use the services of the building; that he did not
          intend to use the services of the business.
     17
     18
                     THE COURT: And your point is that's the County's
     19
          misunderstanding, deliberate or not, of the ADA law?
09:03AM 20
                     MR. DARNELL: Yes. Ninth Circuit controlling
          authority under CREEC, Your Honor.
      21
     22
                     THE COURT:
                                 I got that.
     23
                     MR. DARNELL: Yes. Okay.
      24
                     THE COURT: So the County, though, I think, does not
          concede these two points. The County in particular does not
09:03AM 25
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1
          concede the factual point that Mr. Estrada was physically
       2
          present and that his statement in the Complaint is not false
          because he was physically present at these three locations.
       3
       4
          The County does not concede that; correct?
                     MR. DARNELL: The County -- well, I don't know if
09:03AM
      5
          they concede whether he was in the parking lot or not.
       6
       7
                     MR. SMITH: We don't concede that.
                     MR. DARNELL: Okay. The County does not concede
       8
          that, Your Honor.
09:03AM 10
                     THE COURT: Okay. So let me play devil's advocate
     11
          with you. Sounds like Mr. Estrada has a great defense to the
     12
          criminal prosecution, and it may fall apart quickly. If you're
     13
          right, it may fall apart pretty quickly.
     14
                     MR. DARNELL: Correct.
09:04AM 15
                     THE COURT: And good for Mr. Estrada. I mean, I'm
     16
          not pulling for him or anything in the criminal prosecution.
     17
          But if you're correct, he will prevail, one would assume, in
     18
          the criminal prosecution. But that's not this case.
          as there's a dispute of fact here, why should I -- it sounds
     19
09:04AM 20
          like you're asking me to adjudicate that and say, "Gee, you're
      21
          right. Mr. Estrada was there. This is a faulty criminal
     22
          prosecution, and I'm going to put a stop to it right now."
     23
                     Is that what you're asking me to do?
      24
                     MR. DARNELL: No, Your Honor.
09:04AM 25
                     THE COURT: Okay.
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MR. DARNELL: I'm asking you to adjudicate the First Amendment right to petition the courts. I'm asking you to adjudicate the anti-retaliation provisions in the ADA and how those two issues, constitutional and congressional, under the ADA statute bar the DA's flawed legal theory. By bringing a flawed legal theory under the ADA, Your Honor points, "Well, go win. Go win that issue."

I would essentially -- I'm not a criminal defense counsel, but criminal defense counsel would have to argue before 12 jurors about what Ninth Circuit juris prudence means under ADA standing law and what is allowed and what's not allowed and why intent doesn't matter. They would be arguing a legal issue which this Court -- Your Honor in particular; I've seen your own rulings as well as other district courts in this building -- other court -- judges in this building -- as well as the Ninth Circuit have always held that is a legal issue.

Federal ADA standing is a legal issue to be decided by the federal judge. It's decided as a threshold matter when you first look at the Complaint. And it's decided based upon numerous cases, some of which are complex, dealing with ADA standing. There's a large history of case law that's involved here.

To ask 12 jurors to decide that legal issue in a state court is not an adequate remedy. To ask a criminal judge presiding over that case is not an adequate remedy when all of

09:06AM 25

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09:05AM 10

09:04AM

the cases clearly hold these are preliminary legal issues on 1 2 federal law to be decided by the federal courts. THE COURT: So is the argument that you're making 3 now -- well, let me say it this way. One of the things that 4 09:06AM 5 caught my attention from all the papers was -- a question arose 6 in my mind. Does the State of California have a sufficient 7 interest in preventing and punishing the filing of meritless or false ADA cases, given that ADA is a federal statute? 8 Is that the point that you're making now? 09:07AM 10 MR. DARNELL: I would agree with your point that the 11 State does have some interest in prosecuting false or meritless 12 Unruh type of actions. The ADA statute is a different issue, but I will concede that. 13 THE COURT: That's where I was going to go next is 14 09:07AM 15 these cases are both ADA federal statute and the Unruh Act is 16 under California law. 17 MR. DARNELL: They are. But to follow up on your 18 point, Your Honor, the State does have an interest in 19 prosecuting meritless, false statements in connection with 09:07AM 20 Unruh claims. Again, meritless, false. The whole analysis 21 here under the Younger exception and whether the DA's 22 prosecution is objectively reasonable requires the Court to 23 look at the claims about ADA standing, to look at are they 24 right when they say he did not properly intend to go into this 09:08AM 25 building. He did not have the right motivation and, therefore,

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his claims before the federal court are fraudulent.
      1
       2
                     That is a legal issue that goes to the heart of
       3
          whether the DA's Complaint, the criminal matter, is objectively
          reasonable or not. At page 8, Your Honor notes that that is
       4
          what the Court has to consider when deciding whether the
09:08AM
      5
       6
          Younger exception applies.
       7
                     And particular, it's in the middle of the page,
          Your Honor, you site to Kugler vs. Helfant. It starts at
       8
          line 15 at page 8 of the tentative. Quote:
09:08AM 10
                      "In the Younger abstention context, bad faith
                'generally means that the prosecution has been
      11
      12
                brought without a reasonable expectation of
                obtaining a valid conviction.'"
      13
      14
                     That's the standard. That's what the Court needs to
09:08AM 15
          apply.
      16
                     THE COURT: So you're arguing that the bad faith
      17
          exception to the Younger abstention applies here. And the bad
      18
          faith is that the County knows that this is a -- this is a
      19
          crummy prosecution. It's based on a -- it's based on a faulty
09:09AM 20
          legal theory?
      21
                     MR. DARNELL: Generally, yes. I wouldn't make it
      22
          subjective, Your Honor. To me, it's an objective standard, an
      23
          objectively unreasonable standard. Because you can have a DA
          who is misguided or doesn't know the ADA ins and outs of the
      24
09:09AM 25
          law and thinks this should be illegal under the ADA, but it's
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1
          not as a matter of law.
       2
                     So if they are misguided or uninformed or just don't
       3
          know the nuances of the ADA standing requirements, of which
          there are many, that DA may have a subjective belief that the
       4
09:09AM
      5
          prosecution is legitimate, that they're going to obtain a
       6
          conviction, but they're wrong as a matter of law. And if the
       7
          DA is wrong as a matter of law, the prosecution, by definition,
          is objectively unreasonable.
       8
                     THE COURT: And objectively unreasonable equals bad
09:10AM 10
          faith or, I should say, necessarily triggers the bad faith
          exception to the Younger abstention?
     11
     12
                     MR. DARNELL: Absolutely.
     13
                     THE COURT: I understand that point. Thank you.
                     MR. DARNELL: Now, I think I hit on this -- and
     14
09:10AM 15
          Your Honor asked me to point out flaws, so I apologize.
     16
                     THE COURT: Don't apologize. Attack this. It's
     17
          your job.
     18
                     MR. DARNELL: Throughout the tentative, it ignores
     19
          the elephant in the room. The critical issue here is is the
09:10AM 20
          DA right or wrong? Can the DA claim that these ADA lawsuits
      21
          were fraudulent or manufactured or false because of something
     22
          having to do with Estrada's intent? Not under Ninth Circuit
     23
          controlling precedent. That is the elephant in the room.
      24
          has to be analyzed under the definition that Your Honor has for
09:11AM 25
          bad faith and what that means at page 8 of the tentative.
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                      The tentative says nothing about ADA standing.
       2
          says nothing about the DA's contentions about never visiting.
       3
          It says nothing about the evidence before this Court that says,
          "Not so fast. He was there." And it says nothing about the
       4
          flawed legal argument about intent and ADA standing.
09:11AM
      5
       6
                      So we need a complete analysis of those issues as it
       7
          relates to the Younger exception before the Court can
          ultimately decide is it objectively reasonable or is the DA's
       8
          case objectively unreasonable, as we contend.
09:11AM 10
                                  In the Younger case itself -- trying to
                      THE COURT:
      11
          refresh myself on the facts of that case -- there was the -- at
      12
          issue in the underlying criminal case was the California
          state's Criminal Syndicalism Act, S-y-n-d-i-c-a-l-i-s-m.
                                                                     The
      13
      14
          argument is that that act was void for vagueness and
09:12AM 15
                        I think the District Court and the Circuit --
      16
          well, this was an odd three-judge District Court, I think, in
      17
          Younger; correct? And then it went to the Supreme Court.
      18
                      In any event, the underlying federal court found
      19
          that the state's criminal act was indeed void for vagueness and
09:12AM 20
          overbreadth. And here, in the Younger case, Justice Black,
      21
          writing for the Court, says the federal court should abstain
      22
          and let this work its way through.
      23
                      So aren't you asking me to do what the Younger case
      24
          itself says that the federal court should not do?
09:13AM 25
                     MR. DARNELL: I am not asking you to do -- well,
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09:14AM 20

09:14AM 25

09:13AM

09:13AM 10

09:14AM 15

one, I would tell you that, if that's what Younger actually holds, we would never have an exception. And we do have exceptions under established case law.

There's a reason that we have exceptions. The only thing, by the way, that Younger holds, Younger sets the standard for abstention. It doesn't set the standard for exceptions to abstention. And the critical cases that I do want to point the Court's attention to are cited in our opposition, one being World Famous Drinking Emporium, which is a Ninth Circuit case from 1987.

Your Honor, you also cite to that at page 8 of your tentative for the proposition that bad faith prosecution or harassment would make abstention inappropriate even when the Younger requirements are met. So there's your answer, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Is that the best Ninth Circuit case talking about the bad faith exception to Younger abstention?

MR. DARNELL: Well, I think the *Kugler* case that Your Honor cited to in the tentative is equally good in providing a sufficient definition with the objectively reasonable requirement, objective belief that it will result in a valid conviction. So I think that those two cases are pretty important for the Court's analysis.

But World Famous is also significant because the Ninth Circuit clarified that the exception to $\mathit{Younger}$ can and

09:15AM 20

09:16AM 25

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09:15AM

will apply where the prosecution is intended to discourage the assertion of constitutionally protected rights.

The ADA cases here -- the underlying ADA cases here involve the assertion of constitutionally protected rights as codified by Congress in the ADA statute. And the prosecution's criminal Complaint against the lawyer and his client for bringing ADA claims infringes upon the First Amendment right to petition the courts for redress.

It also results in an incredible chilling effect as evidence by the material submitted to the Court. No filings having been submitted because, as soon as you file something, we're going to get another amendment to the criminal Indictment or the criminal Complaint or a new criminal Complaint based upon their theory, which we contend is wrong as a matter of law.

THE COURT: Say the last part again. You're saying as soon as I rule, there will be a --

MR. DARNELL: The evidence -- and I apologize if I wasn't clear. The evidence before this Court in our moving papers and the reply show that Cornell and Estrada have visited -- that Estrada has visited facilities which have violations, that he encountered access barriers, and lawsuits have not been filed because of the chilling effect from the DA's prosecution. The concern being that, if the DA contends that intent or motive is somehow relevant in the other cases,

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          they're going to try to bring another flawed legal criminal
          Complaint based on any new cases that are filed by Estrada or
       2
          Cornell. There has been a chilling effect, and the evidence of
       3
          that is before the Court.
       4
                     THE COURT: All right. Thank you.
09:16AM
      5
       6
                     MR. DARNELL: My colleague just reminded me that
       7
          Diamond is another case, a Ninth Circuit case, dealing with the
          exception to Younger. That's cited in your opposition -- I'm
       8
          sorry -- in your tentative, Your Honor. It's also cited in the
09:16AM 10
          moving papers and the reply. It's at page 9 of the tentative.
     11
                     THE COURT: Diamond D.
     12
                     MR. DARNELL: Diamond D.
                     THE COURT: That's a Second Circuit case.
     13
                     MR. DARNELL: Oh, I apologize. It is a Second
     14
09:16AM 15
          Circuit case, you are correct. For some reason, my notes
     16
          indicated it's a Ninth Circuit. But I do see in their
          tentative it's Second Circuit.
     17
     18
                     THE COURT: Well, I think it's Second Circuit.
     19
          your reply papers I think you don't give what circuit it's --
09:17AM 20
          in your reply papers, page ii, in the Table of Authorities,
      21
          line 16, is a Diamond D case. You say that it's 2002, but you
     22
          don't say what circuit.
     23
                     MR. DARNELL: In the moving papers, Your Honor,
      24
          that's Docket 22-1, (ii), we cite to Diamond D as well. It's
09:17AM 25
          in page 24 of the actual motion, but (ii), that does reference
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          Ninth Circuit 2002. Now --
       2
                     THE COURT: Hold on one second. Let me get there.
       3
          Okay. I'm in your --
       4
                     MR. DARNELL: Docket 22-1, Roman numeral ii.
                     THE COURT: Right. So there you cite Diamond D.
09:18AM
      5
       6
          You're on line 27?
       7
                     MR. DARNELL: Correct.
                     THE COURT: As a Ninth Circuit case. But is it?
       8
                     MR. DARNELL: I believe it is.
09:18AM 10
                      (Counsel conferred off the record.)
     11
                     MR. DARNELL: Okay. My colleague just clarified,
     12
          Your Honor. I apologize. It is a Second Circuit case, and I
          apologize for making that error in our moving papers.
     13
                     THE COURT: Okay. Is there a Diamond D analog in
     14
09:18AM 15
          the Ninth Circuit?
     16
                     MR. DARNELL: I would contend that the Diamond D
          analog in the Ninth Circuit is Kugler. Well, that's a U.S.
     17
     18
          Supreme Court case.
     19
                     There is World Famous that does acknowledge that bad
09:18AM 20
          faith prosecution or harassment is an exception. So
          World Famous is a Ninth Circuit case that seems to be
      21
          consistent with the Diamond D case. Because bad faith is,
     22
     23
          obviously, consistent with Diamond D's holding of a prosecution
      2.4
          initiated by retaliation, harassing, or other illegal motives.
09:19AM 25
                     THE COURT: So you made the argument earlier that
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          there's an objective standard that bad faith doesn't
       2
          necessarily have to mean that, in this instance, the
          prosecutor, the County of Riverside, has some objective bad
       3
          intent; that bad faith can arise from simply a faulty legal
       4
          theory, even if it's a mistakenly faulty legal theory --
09:19AM
      5
                     MR. DARNELL: Correct.
       6
       7
                     THE COURT: -- correct?
       8
                     MR. DARNELL: Correct.
       9
                     THE COURT: What's the case that stands for that
09:19AM 10
          proposition?
      11
                     MR. DARNELL: Well, I believe it's based on a
      12
          reasonable interpretation of the Kugler holding by the
      13
          U.S. Supreme Court in 1975. "Reasonable expectations," the
      14
          language that's there, that's the word that the U.S. Supreme
09:19AM 15
          Court adopted.
      16
                     As the Court probably knows, whenever we're talking
          about reasonable expectations, that's always adjudicated from
      17
      18
          the objective standard. The subjective reasonable expectations
      19
          are not relevant to -- when you're talking about an issue of
09:20AM 20
          bad faith because you can always have somebody who is either --
      21
          has the blinders on, is refusing to know the law, refusing to
      22
          do what they need to do. It has to be judged from an objective
      23
          standard and not the subjective views of the prosecuting DA.
      24
                     THE COURT: Okay.
09:20AM 25
                     MR. DARNELL: By the way, if it was subjective,
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1
          every case of prosecutorial misconduct would arguably meet the
       2
          requirement that it was subjectively reasonable in the eyes of
       3
          that prosecutor to do what they did. And that cannot be the
          standard of law.
       4
                     THE COURT: Are plaintiffs also advancing the theory
09:20AM
      5
       6
          here that the prosecution, the defendant here, was acting in
       7
          subjective bad faith? I mean, your papers, I think a few
          times, talk about the, I'll call it, aggressive execution of
       8
          the search warrant on Mr. Estrada.
09:21AM 10
                     When it comes to -- I don't think there's a lot of
      11
          information on this in the papers, but when it comes to the
      12
          press release, I don't know how common a press release like
      13
          that is. I don't know if the County is issuing a press release
          for almost every arrest. I kind of doubt it. But what
      14
09:21AM 15
          triggers the County to issue such a press release? Are there
      16
          lots of them? Are there few of them? Is this one typical?
          this one unusual in some sense in either substance or tone?
      17
                                                                        Ι
      18
          don't know all of those things.
      19
                     But the question -- with all the musing, the
09:21AM 20
          question is are plaintiffs saying that the prosecutor is acting
      21
          in bad faith?
      22
                     MR. DARNELL: Both objectively and subjectively.
      23
                     THE COURT: Okay. And I assume you're pointing to
      24
          all the things that I just referenced?
09:22AM 25
                     MR. DARNELL: Well, those are some of the things.
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1
          The other thing is the declaration from Deputy District
       2
          Attorney Tim Brown before this Court. In the opposition he
       3
          purports to say all kinds of things that he has no personal
          knowledge of, but he says them under penalty of perjury.
       4
                     THE COURT: So there are lots of -- I'll comment
09:22AM
      5
       6
          there are lots of evidentiary objections. I've looked at
       7
          those. I haven't ruled on them -- I thought about them -- but
          I didn't think I needed to in view of the tentative, if I stick
       8
          with the tentative.
09:22AM 10
                     MR. DARNELL: If Your Honor sticks with the
     11
          tentative, I suppose we don't get that far. But, again, my
     12
          critique of the tentative is that it's flawed because it
          doesn't consider the underlying claims and the evidence, which
     13
          is required for the objectively reasonable analysis.
     14
                     And I just want to point out, Your Honor, it's not
09:23AM 15
     16
          just the evidentiary objections. We submit that Mr. Brown has
     17
          outright lied to this Court. He has stated that Cornell would
     18
          text -- send text messages to Mr. Estrada about specific
     19
          businesses and locations on where to go.
09:23AM 20
                     That is false. There is no record of that before
      21
          the Court. We provided the Court with a certified transcript.
     22
          That is a false statement under penalty of perjury.
     23
                     He's also made statements that there is no evidence
      24
          that Mr. Estrada ever visited these locations. Obviously,
09:23AM 25
          there is evidence now with the reply. At the time of -- at the
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time of his opposition, he didn't have the benefit of those
       1
       2
          photographs. So I'll give him that leeway.
                     But there is actually evidence in the DA's own file.
       3
          They have geolocation data showing that Mr. Estrada was at
       4
          these locations. So their prosecution, in claiming he was
09:24AM
      5
          never there, is undermined by their own evidence in their own
       6
       7
          search warrant.
                     THE COURT: Did the prosecution have that evidence
       8
          when the prosecution initiated the criminal -- initiated the
09:24AM 10
          criminal prosecution?
      11
                     MR. DARNELL: Yes, Your Honor. They signed a search
      12
          warrant, under penalty of perjury, on March 4, 2022.
                     THE COURT: But how much of this information,
      13
          this -- what's the word I'm looking for? Exculpatory
      14
09:24AM 15
          information. How much exculpatory information did the
      16
          prosecution have at that time?
      17
                     MR. DARNELL: I believe they had -- the exculpatory
      18
          information I'm referring to, as described in their search
      19
          warrant of early March 2022, that includes geolocation data,
09:24AM 20
          cell tower data for Estrada's cell phone, showing that he was
      21
          in the proximity of Corona Animal Hospital for 90 minutes on
      22
          the day in question. Despite that, they have now come before
          this Court and said there's no evidence that he was ever there.
      23
                     THE COURT: What's the status of the criminal
      24
          prosecution? I know there was a hearing set on the demurrer on
09:25AM 25
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1
          July 1st. I don't know what happened. What's the status now?
                     MR. DARNELL: I believe -- I will have to defer to
       2
       3
          my colleague on more details. I don't want to speak out of
          turn or misstate. But my understanding is that there was
       4
09:25AM
      5
          another continuance. So no rulings, no formal arraignment.
       6
                     MR. SMITH: I'm not sure about the arraignment.
       7
                     MR. DARNELL: I'm not sure about the arraignment
          either.
       8
                     But no formal rulings on any merit-based issues.
09:25AM 10
          And I think the prosecution did recently provide some
      11
          discovery, including the search warrant that I just described.
      12
          But I don't think all discovery has been provided in that
          criminal case.
      13
      14
                     THE COURT: But it does not look, from your
09:25AM 15
          perspective -- your perspective and your client's perspective,
      16
          that the prosecution is backing down and will abandon this
      17
          case?
      18
                     MR. DARNELL: I have not yet seen any indication of
      19
          that, Your Honor.
09:26AM 20
                     THE COURT: Okay. Thank you for the aside. Please
      21
          continue. Poke more holes.
      22
                     MR. DARNELL: Yes, Your Honor. Let me see if I
      23
          can -- I think I made my -- my most significant point that I
      2.4
          want the Court to understand is that the analysis of the
09:26AM 25
          District Attorney's theory of ADA standing and deceit and fraud
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1
          before the federal courts, that has to be included in the
       2
          Younger abstention exception analysis in the Court's tentative,
       3
          and it is not.
                     The Court also does make a comment -- I appreciate
       4
09:26AM
      5
          the question. The Court asked at page 2 of the tentative:
                      "...what happens when those same ADA
       6
       7
                litigants conduct high-frequency litigation
                fraudulently and deceitfully..."
       8
                      The Court continues by saying "That question is not
09:26AM 10
          before the Court here."
      11
                      I think that's incorrect, Your Honor. That question
          is before the Court here. That question has to be answered.
      12
      13
          It's wrapped up into the Younger exception.
      14
                      THE COURT: So the question that's before the Court
09:27AM 15
          is if there's evidence that the high-frequency ADA litigants
      16
          are not behaving fraudulently and deceitfully, then that
      17
          question is before me?
                     MR. DARNELL: I believe it's before Your Honor.
      18
      19
                      THE COURT: And if I conclude that they are not
09:27AM 20
          behaving fraudulently and deceitfully, then I should issue the
      21
          requested injunction?
      22
                     MR. DARNELL: Yes.
                                          I would phrase the question
      23
          slightly differently. What happens when the prosecution's
      24
          theory of fraud contradicts and undermines the ADA statute and
09:27AM 25
          Ninth Circuit precedent?
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1
                     Another issue, stated differently, what happens when
       2
          the state prosecution conflicts with the U.S. Constitution,
       3
          federal act of Congress, the ADA?
                      THE COURT: Now, let's say you're dead right, that
       4
          all of your evidence about why plaintiffs were not behaving
09:28AM
      5
       6
          improperly in any way -- you're dead right about all that.
       7
          They're vindicated. The criminal prosecution either fails with
       8
          an acquittal or is dropped.
                      Don't your clients still have remedies available to
09:28AM 10
          them a Section 1983 lawsuit or -- I'm not going to be their
      11
          lawyer, but I can think of many things that perhaps they could
      12
          do. Is that not the case?
                     MR. DARNELL: Well, they do have a remedy,
      13
          Your Honor. They have filed an ADA retaliation lawsuit in this
      14
09:28AM 15
          case. They contend that the State's prosecution violates the
      16
          ADA's anti-retaliation statute.
      17
                      THE COURT: When you say they filed that case,
      18
          you're talking about --
      19
                     MR. DARNELL: It's in the First Amended Complaint
09:29AM 20
          before Your Honor in this case. It's set forth at page 2,
      21
          page 1, page 9. The anti-retaliation provisions are cited to
      22
          extensively in the First Amended Complaint. It's actually
      23
          paragraph 2, paragraph 9, and paragraph 19 of Docket 18, which
      2.4
          is the First Amended Complaint.
09:29AM 25
                     THE COURT: So I'm looking at that. Which claim for
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          relief are you referring to?
       2
                     MR. DARNELL: Well, it's the injunctive relief claim
       3
          based upon the criminal prosecution's violation of
          anti-retaliation and anti-interference provisions. If you want
       4
09:29AM
      5
          to be more particular, you can look at paragraph 2 and
       6
          paragraph 19, Your Honor. And the third cause of action is
       7
          also specifically for violation of the anti-retaliation
          provision.
       8
                     THE COURT: And what remedies are available to
09:30AM 10
          plaintiffs under the third cause of action?
      11
                     MR. DARNELL: Good question, Your Honor. The same
      12
          remedies that the Court granted in Dilworth, which is the civil
          rights case about the African American men who tried to sit in
      13
      14
          the nonwhite section, and the DA there prosecuted them.
          federal court in that case granted an injunction ultimately.
09:30AM 15
      16
          Well, I should say it went up and then it went back down with
      17
          an order to the trial court to consider the granting of an
      18
          injunction because the state prosecution violated federal law.
      19
                     THE COURT: So two things. Dilworth was Fifth
          Circuit?
09:30AM 20
      21
                     MR. DARNELL: Yes.
      22
                     THE COURT: And the answer to my question, what
      23
          remedies?
      24
                     MR. DARNELL: Injunction.
09:30AM 25
                     THE COURT: Injunction.
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MR. DARNELL: I mentioned Dilworth because Dilworth applies the same exact remedies and the same statutory basis for granting injunctive relief as specifically authorized by the ADA statute. The ADA anti-retaliation provisions specifically reference injunctive relief. THE COURT: Okay. So let's say I ultimately conclude you're dead right on your third cause of action in the First Amended Complaint and I grant an injunction. What does that injunction say? "County, don't prosecute these plaintiffs as you are doing. Stop that"? MR. DARNELL: We've asked for five things in our moving papers, to stay the prosecution; to dismiss the prosecution if the Court finds that it truly does violate -- at this point we're on a preliminary injunction. So, to be fair, Your Honor, your ruling in this case would most appropriately be preliminary in nature. But, ultimately, we will be seeking an order of dismissing the prosecution entirely. But I think at a minimum, at this stage in the preliminary injunction, the Court should stay the prosecution.

The DA should be ordered, the third item, to retract its press release concerning the plaintiffs. It's based on a fundamental misunderstanding or a flawed view of ADA law where they've accused an attorney in good standing before the State Bar, before the State, with no criminal history whatsoever, of engaging in fraud and deceit in a public press release, which

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09:34AM 25

is highly unusual and perhaps politically motivated, Your Honor. I don't have evidence before that. This is argument.

restrained and enjoined from interfering with pending lawsuits based on similar flawed views and reasoning about intent or motivation. What they're doing is chilling the First Amendment right to petition the courts and do things that are specifically authorized by ADA juris prudence, particularly CREEC, in the Ninth Circuit. What they describe as the manufacturing of ADA claims is an attack on tester ADA claims.

U.S. Supreme Court, have repeatedly referred to testers in similar contexts -- civil rights statutes as well as, in particular, with ADA claims -- as being legitimate plaintiffs with every right to pursue the claims provided by the ADA. This is an attack on those principles, and it's a violation of

The last item is that the District Attorney's Office investigation in further acts of, what I will call, unlawful retaliation. I think it's appropriate that the Court phrases the injunctive relief being granted in the context of the DA's flawed or unlawful interpretation of the ADA statute. If they contend somehow that this is actually fraud or deceit and it

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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          violates the ADA or violates some other statute, that would be
       2
          a different issue. And that's not what we're seeking.
       3
                     THE COURT: All right. Thank you. That's helpful.
       4
                     Let me posit a hypothetical world where plaintiffs
09:34AM
      5
          either did not bring this lawsuit or I go with the tentative
       6
          and dismiss it.
       7
                     Let's say the prosecution -- the criminal
          prosecution, again, either moves forward and results in an
       8
          acquittal or is dropped because the prosecution determines that
09:34AM 10
          it has a meritless case. Is it not true that plaintiffs still
      11
          have remedies -- have more remedies available to them under
      12
          Section 1983 or otherwise? Could they not still obtain perhaps
      13
          money damages?
      14
                     I mean, there's an allegation here that these
09:35AM 15
          plaintiffs and other ADA plaintiffs have deliberately chosen
      16
          not to bring new claims because of the existence of this
      17
          lawsuit. I can see an argument where money damages could arise
      18
          from that.
      19
                     Are there not remedies available, if all of that is
09:35AM 20
          true, at the end of the day?
      21
                     MR. DARNELL: Two things. I would contend that
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          there are remedies available. Being an advocate for my client,
      23
          I will also recognize that the defense would argue otherwise.
      24
          The defense would argue that this Court's ruling on the Younger
09:35AM 25
          abstention doctrine constitutes res judicata or collateral
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estoppel in the finding that the federal court has no jurisdiction to restrain or to preside over an action against the District Attorney relating to this conduct.

So whether it's 1983 or whether it's the ADA anti-retaliation statute that we have, this Court's ruling, they will argue, has collateral estoppel or res judicata effect on other federal claims.

The second part of --

THE COURT: Do you have any authority, one way or the other, on that? I'll tell you I never regarded the Younger abstention of having those broad effects.

MR. DARNELL: I think that we would argue -- if that argument was made, we would argue that Younger abstention is essentially a jurisdictional or standing preliminary evaluation. But I don't know the answer where the Court would ultimately rule, if that issue was raised.

If counsel wants to stipulate that they will not challenge the federal court's jurisdiction in the event a 1983 action is filed, then I feel a little bit more comfortable with where we stand. But the issue really that I want to focus on is what's before the Court. What's before the Court is an ADA anti-retaliation claim that's ripe, that's pending, and that's at issue in this case. So I appreciate the hypothetical.

I would also note that, if my client prevails in the criminal prosecution, there may be a malicious prosecution

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

1 claim to be asserted back against them in state court. 2 there may be other rights and other remedies. But I don't 3 think that should influence the Court's analysis of the rights and the remedies that are presently pending before it. 4 09:37AM 5 THE COURT: Okay. That's helpful. What else? MR. DARNELL: I think I've hinted on the -- on why 6 7 we contend 12 jurors is not an adequate forum and a criminal judge in the state court is not an adequate forum. There's 8 numerous cases, that I'm sure Your Honor is aware of, that talk 09:38AM 10 about ADA standing being a threshold legal issue to be 11 determined by the federal courts. And, obviously, there's a 12 plethora of case law addressing that. The last thing I would comment on -- there's two 13 14 things, Your Honor, the first thing being the Court's 09:38AM 15 opposition seems to make much ado about the state's interest --16 it starts at the bottom of page 7 and carries over to the top 17 of page 8 -- the state's interest in enforcing the Unruh aspect 18 of the underlying claims or perhaps addressing that. 19 respectfully submit that the federal courts, Congress, and the 09:38AM 20 U.S. Constitution have a much more substantial compelling 21 interest in this case. 22 First, the prosecution is directed at statements in 23 federal court in unverified pleadings about the ADA standing. 24 As a result, the federal courts in Congress have a compelling 09:39AM 25 interest in the state court prosecution, particularly when that

prosecution conflicts with federal ADA law.

The bottom line here, Your Honor, is while the DA may have some interest in the Unruh statute, it's secondary to the federal interest. And, more importantly, the DA is not Congress. It does not have the power to write or revise the ADA statute. It does not have the power to say what Ninth Circuit law is with respect to ADA standing. And it does not have the power to enforce what they contend the ADA says when it violates controlling federal precedent.

My last point, Your Honor, is the tentative does not -- and I think I've hinted on this. The tentative does not appreciate or acknowledge the underlying claims. The First Amended Complaint in the injunctive relief is based on constitutional violations, namely, the First Amendment and the right to petition the courts. It's set forth at paragraph 1 of the First Amended Complaint.

The First Amended Complaint also alleges how the DA's criminal prosecution violates the ADA anti-retaliation statute. Again, that's the third cause of action in the First Amended Complaint or the third claim. It's also set forth at paragraph 2, paragraph 9, and paragraph 19.

Paragraph 19 is kind of the summary paragraph, that, when you want to talk about what this case is about and the constitutional violations and the ADA retaliation issues, there are six bullet points listed in paragraph 19. That's this

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case, Your Honor. The tentative doesn't acknowledge that, and we believe it should. And we believe that there's case law that specifically notes the U.S. Supreme Court, in particular, in Dombrowski vs. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 at 486. This is cited in our motion at pages 18 to 19.

that criminal prosecutions need to be more closely scrutinized when they are based on an overbroad sweep or the hazard or loss or substantial impairment of precious constitutional rights are at issue. So we believe that U.S. Supreme Court precedent requires the Court to put the underlying claims in proper context in the tentative, which I don't think those claims have

questions that the Court may have or perhaps after my colleague

next-to-the-last major point that you made, you talked about the federal court's interest in -- I'm paraphrasing -- interest in, among other things, ensuring the ADA law is properly enforced. Again, I'm paraphrasing. The challenges to the criminal prosecution that you're raising with me, all of those are available and can be raised with the state court in connection with the criminal prosecution; correct?

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MR. DARNELL: They can be. But are they adequate?
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       2
          Is the forum adequate?
       3
                      THE COURT: Why would that forum not be adequate?
       4
                     MR. DARNELL: Because -- and I think I touched on
          this earlier -- all of the ADA cases that address standing, and
09:43AM
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       6
          even standing cases that Your Honor has issued specifically
       7
          know how that's a threshold legal issue to be determined by the
          federal court. It's a federal ADA claim. It's before the
       8
          federal court. It's a, quote, "essential and unchanging part
09:43AM 10
          of the case or controversy" requirement for Article III. It's
          an integral component of subject matter jurisdiction in those
      11
          underlying cases before the Court. The federal courts know
      12
          these issues in and out.
      13
                     Criminal courts, 12 jurors sitting in a box in a
      14
09:44AM 15
          criminal case in Riverside, they know nothing about this.
      16
          is why this Court is more appropriate to adjudicate the ADA
          standing issues, especially, again, when they tie into Younger
      17
      18
          exception.
      19
                      THE COURT: All right. I understand that point.
09:44AM 20
          Thank you very much. And I'll give you a chance to respond to
      21
          Mr. Smith.
      22
                                    Thank you, Your Honor.
                     MR. DARNELL:
      23
                     THE COURT:
                                  Thank you.
      24
                     Mr. Smith?
09:44AM 25
                                  Thank you, Your Honor.
                     MR. SMITH:
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THE COURT: Please, same thing.
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       2
                     MR. SMITH:
                                 Yes.
                     THE COURT: Please attack the tentative or buttress
       3
               And, of course, please respond to the eloquence of
       4
          Mr. Darnell.
09:44AM
      5
       6
                     MR. SMITH: Yeah. Thank you, Your Honor.
       7
                     I guess I would start out by -- obviously, the
          tentative is in favor of the County. So I certainly agree with
       8
          the tentative.
09:45AM 10
                     I listened to Mr. Darnell. He raised very good
     11
          issues. He -- honestly, he did. And I think he argued very
     12
          eloquently and made some good points, but I don't think they're
     13
          valid points. And I think the arguments were blending two big
          issues. One is application of the Younger abstention doctrine
     14
09:45AM 15
          and what are the elements for application of that abstention
     16
          and have those elements been met. That's one issue,
     17
          Your Honor, that involves its own separate analysis. And then
     18
          whether or not a preliminary injunction should be granted
     19
          here -- because that's the remedy that's being sought pursuant
09:45AM 20
          to this motion for the preliminary injunction -- obviously,
     21
          that has its own elements, in all likelihood, it's excess and
     22
          whatnot.
     23
                     And even in the Court's tentative, I believe -- and
     24
          I don't want to misspeak what the Court was saying, but my
09:46AM 25
          understanding of the tentative was we need to first look at
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1 Younger and whether Younger applies before we really even get 2 into the underlying merits that might give rise and warrant an injunction. And so I think --3 4 THE COURT: Your point is even if you lose on Younger -- that is, I abandon the tentative and do not invoke 09:46AM 5 6 Younger abstention -- you still win in the sense that I should 7 not issue a preliminary injunction? That's right, Your Honor. But I'm also 8 MR. SMITH: saying that I believe a lot of Mr. Darnell's arguments were, I 09:46AM 10 believe, an attack on the prosecution's case. In other words, 11 the merits of the underlying criminal case for which that 12 criminal judge can resolve all of those issues. 13 Now, I understand the way Mr. Darnell was arguing 14 that was that, well, that all relates to that singular 09:47AM 15 exception -- I know there's a couple more than that, but the 16 exception to the Younger case that that -- the lack of merit 17 to the prosecution focused on an absence of standing in 18 connection with the ADA claims or lawsuits that were filed, 19 that that constitutes bad faith and, therefore, you know, bad 09:47AM 20 faith is an exception to Younger. And I can address that in a 21 few minutes. But, certainly, I believe there's a -- the 22 elements of Younger, before we even get to the exception, they 23 all apply here, Your Honor. And I think the Court pointed that 2.4 out in the tentative. 09:47AM 25 I mean, there's no dispute here that there's, one,

an ongoing criminal prosecution, that the proceedings do implicate important state interest. Whether there's federal interest in ADA litigation -- I mean, you even concede that, Your Honor, in your tentative. But the standard for Younger is whether the proceedings -- those criminal proceedings implicate important state interest -- and they certainly do, and you pointed them out in the tentative -- and whether or not this proceeding, what's being pursued here, would interfere with those proceedings. And, obviously, they would in terms of the remedy that's being sought here.

And then the other big element with respect to Younger is whether there are adequate opportunities in the state proceeding to raise these constitutional challenges, which there absolutely are. I mean, there's been a demurrer that's been filed in the criminal case that allows those criminal defendants to make these very same challenges to the criminal judge.

THE COURT: I understand Mr. Darnell to be pushing back very hard on the existence of the elements, Younger, other than he made the point that the tentative does not deal with the plaintiffs' standing -- I'll call it a standing defense to the criminal prosecution. But I understood Mr. Darnell to be arguing, among other things, the bad faith exception to the Younger doctrine.

And let me jump straight to that. I do want to hear

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09:48AM

1 the rest of your argument, but it was troubling hearing about 2 the -- again, I'll call it an aggressive execution of the search warrant, at least on -- or warrants -- at least on 3 4 Mr. Estrada. You know, there's a photograph of the SWAT-like 09:49AM 5 police officers -- well, police officers employing SWAT-like 6 tactics to serve a subpoena -- to serve a search warrant, 7 rather, on a gentleman who's a paraplegic and who's not accused of committing any kind of a violent crime. He's accused of 8 filing a paper that had some falsities in it. 09:50AM 10 Why was it necessary to do that? 11 MR. SMITH: I -- well, I don't have that evidence, 12 Your Honor, in terms of what we submitted in our paperwork. 13 Certainly, he was arrested pursuant for violations of Penal 14 Code 115, a felony. There were several felonies, procuring --09:50AM 15 offering false or forced instruments to public office. He was 16 also arrested for conspiring to violate Business and 17 Professions Code 6128, that prohibits attorneys from engaging 18 in deceit or conclusion [sic]. So there are multiple felonies 19 that he was charged with. 09:50AM 20 So the fact that the -- I think the claim in the 21 moving papers is that he should have been given some kind of 22 advance notice or been permitted to turn himself in. 23 aware of any legal requirement. And the fact that law 24 enforcement went out there in what is being described as a 09:51AM 25 less-than-pleasant approach to arresting someone or searching

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someone's home does not give rise at all to a bad faith conduct
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       2
          by a prosecutor.
                     THE COURT: Is that typically the way that the
       3
       4
          police department executes a search warrant in circumstances
          like this one?
09:51AM
      5
       6
                     MR. SMITH: I can say it's not untypical,
       7
          Your Honor. I know this is not before the Court, but I can
          absolutely represent --
       8
                     THE COURT: Well, it kind of is in the sense of the
09:52AM 10
          bad faith.
      11
                     MR. SMITH: Well, anecdotally, Your Honor -- I know
      12
          this is not evidence before the Court. But in Riverside, my
          brother-in-law, who works for me, his wife is a nurse. And she
      13
          apparently neglected to treat bedsores on a patient. That
      14
09:52AM 15
          patient ultimately expired, and Emily was charged with a
          felony. And at 5:00 o'clock in the morning, SWAT team members
      16
      17
          showed up in Riverside at my brother-in-law's house, surrounded
      18
          the house, and took her into custody.
      19
                     THE COURT: Okay. So the answer may be that it is
09:52AM 20
          typical when executing a search warrant pertaining to an
      21
          underlying alleged felony.
      22
                     MR. SMITH: Uh-huh.
      23
                     THE COURT: One of the things you said, Mr. Estrada
      24
          was arrested. Was he arrested? Because I'm looking at
09:52AM 25
          Exhibit G of -- well, attached to defendants' opposition
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1
          papers, which is -- first page is a supplemental report,
       2
          Riverside County District Attorney supplemental report. And
          it's provided by -- I'm going to get this name wrong -- Johnny
       3
       4
          Gubernat, G-u-b-e-r-n-a-t, I belive.
                     In any event, Suspect -- I'm about two-thirds of the
09:53AM
      5
          way down the page -- Suspect -- "Sus Number 1. Name: Estrada,
       6
       7
          Bryan Eduardo." Above that, "Arrested: Yes, No," the "No" box
          is checked. And I think, reading the summary supplemental
       8
          narrative, the rest of Exhibit G, it does not say -- the person
09:54AM 10
          providing this report does not say that Mr. Estrada was
     11
          arrested.
     12
                     MR. SMITH: Well, he's currently facing felony
     13
          criminal charges, Your Honor.
     14
                     THE COURT: So at least he was not taken into
09:54AM 15
          custody at that time?
     16
                     MR. SMITH: Honestly, Your Honor, I don't know the
     17
          answer to that. I thought he was.
     18
                                 Okay. Well, it's unclear in my mind.
                     THE COURT:
     19
          But we're talking about the bad faith allegation by plaintiffs.
09:54AM 20
          So thank you for your response on the aggressive execution of
      21
          the search warrant.
     22
                     What can you tell me about the press release?
     23
          those typical? Is this atypical? Does the County issue those
      24
          in every case where there's some public interest that is not
          just a -- I don't mean to minimize it, but a common street
09:55AM 25
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crime that doesn't -- isn't likely to generate public interest?
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          And was this press release atypical in any way in terms of its
          substance or tone? What can you tell me about --
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       4
                     MR. SMITH: Yeah, the press release, Your Honor, is
          almost -- I think it's verbatim from the arrest warrant.
      5
09:55AM
          the language is pulled from an arrest warrant signed by the
       6
       7
          judge.
                      They aren't done, obviously, in every single case.
       8
          We don't see them out in Riverside every single day, but there
          are various arrest warrants, and then press releases follow.
09:55AM 10
      11
          Certainly, matters of public interest. But the fact that --
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                      THE COURT: What's the process for issuing a press
      13
          release based upon an arrest? Who makes that decision and how
      14
          is it made?
09:56AM 15
                     MR. SMITH: I believe it's the District Attorney's
          Office, working through their public information office.
      16
      17
          Beyond that, I don't know. I don't know all the details with
      18
          respect to issuance of a press release.
      19
                      THE COURT: And another answer is it's not in the
09:56AM 20
          record before me.
      21
                     MR. SMITH: It's not in the record before
      22
          Your Honor. But I would just point out the fact that there's
      23
          no evidence that that press release was in any way --
      24
                     THE COURT: Atypical?
09:56AM 25
                     MR. SMITH: -- atypical, inaccurate, false in any
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1
          way. And certainly not indicative of bad faith. They were
       2
          arrested. The facts in the press release are not inaccurate.
          And even if there were some inaccuracies, there's no indication
       3
          that that's the result of any bad faith action on the part of
       4
09:57AM
      5
          the prosecution.
       6
                     THE COURT: What's the current status of the
       7
          criminal prosecution? We talked a little bit about the hearing
       8
          that was set for July 1st on the demurrer that apparently, I
          understand, has been continued. But in view of the additional
09:57AM 10
          evidence -- I'll call it information -- that plaintiffs have
     11
          provided, particularly in their reply papers, has the County
     12
          rethought this criminal prosecution? Is it going to be
     13
          dropped? What's the status?
     14
                     MR. SMITH: I don't know the status to that,
09:57AM 15
          Your Honor. I will say the evidence that was provided to
     16
          Mr. Darnell for which he provided to the Court in the reply,
     17
          that was recently released by the District Attorney, like,
     18
          within the last few days -- in fact, I wasn't even sure at the
     19
          time -- within the last week -- couple weeks or so. But I
09:58AM 20
          believe the DA released that in the criminal case prior to the
      21
          actual date that, you know, the prosecutor and the parties were
     22
          required in that criminal case to disclose evidence.
     23
          they're still, I think, fairly early in that process in terms
      24
          of discovery.
09:58AM 25
                     For example, the transcript, you know, we got it at
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the same time that Mr. Darnell did, when it was released by the
       1
       2
          District Attorney in the criminal case, the audio interview and
          some of these other things.
       3
                      THE COURT: Housekeeping question. You have filed
       4
      5
          a -- an application for leave to file a sur-reply.
09:58AM
       6
                     MR. SMITH:
                                  I did, Your Honor.
       7
                     THE COURT: And I looked at the sur-reply, I read
          it. There was no opposition. I guess I should turn this
       8
          question to Mr. Darnell.
09:58AM 10
                      Should I just grant that application for leave to
      11
          file a sur-reply?
      12
                     MR. DARNELL: No, Your Honor.
                     THE COURT: Okay. We'll come back to that.
      13
                     MR. DARNELL: I didn't get an application.
      14
09:59AM 15
          sur-reply -- under the Local Rules you have to file an ex parte
      16
          application. They just filed it, Your Honor.
      17
                      THE COURT: Well, they filed it with a -- there's a
      18
          request for leave to file it, which I took it as an ex parte
      19
          application.
09:59AM 20
                     MR. DARNELL: Well, Your Honor, you can grant it.
      21
          But I would say that there's ample authorities that are cited
      22
          in our reply brief that rebuttal evidence is not new and does
      23
          not justify --
      2.4
                     THE COURT: Yes, I saw that.
09:59AM 25
                     MR. DARNELL: That's the Ninth Circuit case Toys "R"
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Us. It's abundantly clear that if you're rebutting what the
       1
       2
          opposition claims, that does not entitle a party to file a
          sur-reply.
       3
                     THE COURT: All right. I'm going to grant that
       4
          application for leave to file a sur-reply. That will be in the
09:59AM
      5
       6
          minute order memorializing this hearing. But I appreciate what
       7
          you're saying, Mr. Darnell.
                      Okay. Mr. Smith, sorry, I hijacked your argument
       8
          with these questions and this housekeeping issue, but please
09:59AM 10
          return to it and tell me what else you'd like to tell me.
      11
                     MR. SMITH: Just on the bad faith, Your Honor, I --
      12
          there's no evidence that the prosecutor is pursuing bad faith.
      13
          The only thing that's been offered is the press release, the
      14
          manner of the arrest or the search, and this standing issue,
10:00AM 15
          that somehow the prosecutor is misinformed or misunderstands
      16
          the law and, therefore, that equates to bad faith. And this
      17
          application of this objective standard rather than a subjective
      18
          standard constitutes bad faith on the part of the prosecutor.
      19
                      THE COURT: So I understand Mr. Darnell to be asking
10:00AM 20
          me to dig into the standing issue.
      21
                     MR. SMITH:
                                  Yeah.
      22
                     THE COURT: As I do often in ADA cases. And he
      23
          asked me to come to the conclusion that plaintiffs here,
      24
          Mr. Estrada in particular, has standing -- had standing to file
10:01AM 25
          those three ADA cases that are at issue. And accordingly, the
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1
          prosecution's theory in the criminal case is necessarily
       2
          faulty. And because it's necessarily faulty, the prosecution
          is acting in bad faith in continuing the criminal prosecution,
       3
          and I ought to do something about that.
       4
                     Now, my point is he's asking me to dig into this --
10:01AM
      5
       6
          the criminal standing -- the ADA standing issue. My tentative
       7
          takes the position, "Well, Younger abstention, I'm going to
          step back from that and let the criminal process take place in
       8
          state court." I think that's what the tentative says. That's
10:02AM 10
          what Younger tells me to do as the better course.
      11
                     But should I dig into -- should I dig into the
      12
          standing issue?
                     MR. SMITH: No. I don't believe the Court should at
      13
      14
          all.
10:02AM 15
                      THE COURT: Well, is Mr. Darnell simply wrong in
      16
          advocating -- in taking the position that Mr. Estrada had
      17
          standing to prosecute those three cases?
      18
                     MR. SMITH: He is wrong. And the prosecutor has
      19
          filed criminal charges against Mr. Estrada and his attorney for
10:02AM 20
          conspiring and colluding to violate the law, to violate
      21
          Business and Professions Code 6128. That prohibits deceit and
      22
          collusion to deceive a party or court; right? So, essentially,
      23
          bogus ADA claims.
                      I think we've outlined some of the evidence for
      24
10:03AM 25
          that, Your Honor. We've submitted the ADA complaints.
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1
          DA's position is -- whether you call it standing or elements of
       2
          the case or a basis for the lawsuit, the DA's position is that
          he was never out there, could have never observed ADA
       3
       4
          deficiencies, never intended to go there, was encouraged and
10:03AM
          told to go there by Mr. Cornell, the attorney, as part of a
      5
          scheme to pressure and extort these small business owners to
       6
       7
          pay a few bucks because they could not afford to defend
          themselves.
       8
                      THE COURT: So the prosecution, the defendant here,
10:03AM 10
          disbelieved the evidence that plaintiffs have submitted,
      11
          particularly in their reply papers, to show that, for example,
      12
          Mr. Estrada really did, I'll call it, investigate, say, the
      13
          first place, the vet shop or --
                                  The prosecution also believes the
      14
                      MR. SMITH:
10:04AM 15
          plaintiffs' own evidence, Your Honor, and that is that the
      16
          audio interview of Mr. Estrada where he states, yeah, the
      17
          initial claims were legitimate, and then he's asked questions
      18
          about all the others, and he specifically asked questions
      19
          about -- I believe it's one of the three -- I think it might be
10:04AM 20
          the vet -- that, yeah, he doesn't remember, he wasn't there,
      21
          that this was all done at the behest of the lawyer.
      22
                      And, if I may, Your Honor, there was an accusation
      23
          that continues to be made -- we've addressed it in the
      24
          sur-reply -- that Deputy District Attorney Timothy Brown
          committed perjury. There's only one reference in the moving
10:04AM 25
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1
          papers and in the reply in terms of Mr. Brown allegedly
       2
          committing perjury, and that's with respect to Mr. Brown's
          statement in his declaration that there was texting going on
       3
          between Mr. Estrada and Mr. Cornell. That's nowhere in the
       4
10:05AM
      5
          transcript.
       6
                      In our sur-reply, Your Honor, we point out exactly
       7
          where it is -- exactly where it is as far as the texting that
          was going on between the two of them, Mr. Cornell texting
       8
          Mr. Estrada, telling him where to go. So I would like to point
10:05AM 10
          that out.
      11
                      THE COURT: So the defendant stands by Mr. Brown's
      12
          declaration on that particular point?
                      MR. SMITH: We do, Your Honor. Yes.
      13
                      THE COURT: Okay. Please continue.
      14
                      MR. SMITH: I think we've covered the -- we've
10:05AM 15
      16
          covered the bad faith. I don't believe it's a purely objective
      17
          standard. I think in our opposing papers we've cited the Perez
      18
          vs. Ledesma case and a quote from it, which I had that in front
      19
          of me, but the quote is:
10:05AM 20
                      "In cases of proven harassment or
      21
                prosecutions undertaken by state officials in bad
      22
                faith without hope of obtaining a valid conviction
      23
                and perhaps in other extraordinary circumstances
      24
                where irreparable injury can be shown, is federal
10:06AM 25
                injunctive relief against pending state
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prosecutions appropriate."

So I think that's important to point out, that there is absolutely a good faith basis for these criminal prosecutions. We are at this point where the charges are going forward. There's going to be a criminal trial. Certainly, Mr. Estrada, Mr. Cornell can challenge the prosecution's case before the judge and ultimately before the jury. Adequate remedies to address the constitutional claims are available to him. The -- again, most of the arguments deal with the merits made by Mr. -- I believe -- a lot of them, anyway, deal with the merits of this underlying case.

The Complaints themselves, if you have a lawyer who knowingly allows a client to file eight, whether it's ADA or state, lawsuits in which there are knowingly false facts in those Complaints designed to pressure small business owners to pay money and extort money from them, those are criminal violations for which a state attorney, District Attorney can pursue. I suppose an example would be -- and, again, these are why these cases are resolved in the criminal case. That's where they're appropriate from a Younger abstention standpoint.

Let's say isn't this -- is this any different than a prosecutor -- I know these aren't the facts of our case, but the prosecutor taking the position that Mr. Estrada does not, in fact, have a disability; that he's really not disabled; that he could get up out of his wheelchair and walk over to your

2 So I think that'

10:06AM

10:06AM 10

10:07AM 15

10:07AM 25

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assistants or walk over to your clerks.
       1
       2
                     And Mr. Darnell would be arguing, "No, he is
          disabled. He has a disability. He's in a wheelchair."
       3
                     And the prosecutor would say, "No, we have evidence
       4
      5
          that he's not disabled." Thus that goes to the underlying
10:08AM
          criminality of what they were doing with respect to these
       6
       7
          lawsuits.
                      That's really not any different here. We're saying
       8
          he wasn't out there, never saw the countertops, never witnessed
          an ADA violation; that, yeah, you do have to have a reason to
10:08AM 10
      11
          go out there. You can't just randomly go around the country,
      12
          or not go there at all, and just have some lawyer or convince
          a lawyer -- have a lawyer sign you up to file all these
      13
      14
          lawsuits.
10:08AM 15
                      THE COURT: Well, backing up for one a little bit,
          are you denying the tester standing is legitimate?
      16
      17
                      MR. SMITH: I'm saying that, in this particular
      18
          case, that is not my understanding of tester standing where
      19
          he's being told by a lawyer, you know, "We're going to be
10:09AM 20
          filing this case" or that case, and the client never goes out
      21
          to that location; is not, in fact, there; does not, in fact,
      22
          see the violations.
      23
                      So that would be my position with respect to that,
      2.4
          Your Honor.
10:09AM 25
                      THE COURT: So, hypothetical, let's say there's a
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1
          place in Riverside County, Acme Distributors. And a lawyer
       2
          notices -- thinks he notices that Acme Distributors does not
          have adequate ADA accommodations, whatever it may be -- a curb,
       3
          handicap accessible, disabled accessible door -- whatever it
       4
10:09AM
      5
          may be. Lawyer spots that.
       6
                     Lawyer says to client -- disabled client, who lawyer
       7
          has represented many times before in ADA cases, "Gee, go take a
          look at Acme Enterprises."
       8
                      Disabled client goes to take a look and says, "Yeah,
10:10AM 10
          I agree, Lawyer. Doesn't meet ADA standards." And the two of
      11
          them file a case. The client, of course, is client, and lawyer
      12
          is lawyer.
                      Is that a legitimate case? Or is there some defect
      13
      14
          in it? Put aside whether or not the Acme Enterprises complies
          with ADA. But the process that they went through to identify
10:10AM 15
      16
          that location and to file that case investigation, is that a
      17
          legitimate case or is it an illegitimate case.
      18
                                  I guess there would be standing in that
                     MR. SMITH:
      19
          particular case. But that's not this case, from the
10:11AM 20
          prosecution's perspective.
      21
                      THE COURT: I understand that last point.
      22
                Sorry for the interruption. Please continue.
      23
                     MR. SMITH: Mr. Darnell did talk about the
      2.4
          importance of the ADA and the federal interest, obviously, in
10:11AM 25
          disabled people being able to pursue violations of the ADA.
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There is nothing that -- about that interest that means that you can use the ADA, or any other federal statute for that matter, to engage in criminal conduct.

You know, I use the example of the disabled person who's not disabled. You know, the ADA doesn't -- there's no federal interest in permitting nondisabled people or people who knowingly do not meet the elements for the claims from pursuing those claims, right? So -- and that's not an element -- as I understand the Younger abstention, it's not an element of the Younger abstention. You look at whether or not there's compelling state interest in proceeding with the criminal case.

As far as the adequate remedies, the Court raised the issue about the 1983 claim. Like, if Mr. -- the Court raises a good point; right? Like, if -- I suppose if he's convicted, right, perhaps he might be barred from pursuing a 1983 claim under Heck v. Humphrey because, in the civil case, he'd have to seek to invalidate the criminal prosecution. But if he's acquitted, my understanding is he would have a 1983 claim that he could pursue.

So I'm not aware and I haven't addressed the issue of whether collateral estoppel or res judicata as a result of the *Younger* abstention ruling would bar that subsequent civil lawsuit.

THE COURT: Should that be a part of my Younger abstention analysis, the availability of these 1983 claims, or

10:12AM

10:12AM 10

10:12AM 15

10:13AM 20

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1
          something that's well past the resolution of the criminal case?
       2
                      MR. SMITH: It should not, Your Honor, because my
       3
          understanding of that element of the Younger abstention
       4
          addresses whether or not there are adequate remedies in the
10:14AM
      5
          underlying state proceeding that allows Mr. Estrada or
       6
          Mr. Cornell to raise the constitutional challenge that he's
       7
          making.
                      So, no, I don't -- I just want to address it because
       8
          it was brought up. But, no, I don't think the Court needs to
          address that, what ultimate remedies would be available way
10:14AM 10
      11
          down the road should the criminal case resolve in Mr. Estrada
          and Mr. Cornell's favor.
      12
      13
                      I think I've covered the main points, Your Honor.
                                                                         I
          don't have anything else.
      14
10:14AM 15
                      THE COURT: I think I asked the so-called
          housekeeping question. I think that covers what I wanted to
      16
          ask --
      17
      18
                     MR. SMITH: Okay.
      19
                      THE COURT: -- you, Mr. Smith, on behalf of your
10:15AM 20
          client. Okay. Thank you.
      21
                      MR. SMITH: Thank you, Your Honor.
      22
                      THE COURT: Mr. Darnell, did you have some rebuttal
      23
          to argue?
      24
                     MR. DARNELL: Brief. Very brief.
10:15AM 25
                      THE COURT: As you can probably tell, I enjoy
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1
          engaging with counsel and give you plenty of time to make your
       2
          record and make your arguments.
                      MR. DARNELL: And we appreciate it, Your Honor.
       3
                                                                        We
          appreciate the Court's time.
       4
                      Just to be clear, I think the Court knows this, but
10:15AM
      5
       6
          we're not arguing the elements of Younger. We're arguing the
       7
          exception to Younger.
                      THE COURT: That's what I understood the case to be.
       8
                      MR. DARNELL: And the exception to Younger, as it
10:15AM 10
          applies in this context, is much broader than the elements. I
      11
          mean, it's a huge exception, particularly when the Court looks
      12
          at the Ninth Circuit opinion in World Famous Drinking Emporium
          vs. City of Tempe -- it's a 1987 case -- that confirms that the
      13
      14
          exception to Younger can apply where the prosecution is
10:16AM 15
          intended to discourage constitutionally protected rights.
      16
          gets into the Section 1983 issue, Your Honor.
      17
                                  What's the answer to the question that I
                      THE COURT:
      18
          posed to Mr. Smith; that is, should I even consider the
      19
          potential availability of those post resolution of criminal
          case remedies?
10:16AM 20
      21
                      MR. DARNELL: To be fair, I think you need to
      22
          consider the merits of the DA's case for purposes of the
      23
          Younger exception. And I think you can also consider what
      24
          might happen down the line for potential rights and remedies
10:16AM 25
          that could be asserted. I don't think they're dispositive.
                                                                        Ι
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don't think they're outcome determinative because a

Section 1983 claim, whenever that's brought way down the road,
cannot address the ongoing violation of the First Amendment
rights that we have here.

And, again, that segues back into World Famous and why there is a Younger exception when you're dealing with constitutional rights. Only an injunction can stop ongoing and continuing violations of constitutional rights. We don't have a time machine in three years that we can go back and rewind all of this, unfortunately.

So that's the only thing I wanted to clarify with respect to the 1983 claim. I don't have a problem if the Court were to consider it, but I don't think it's outcome determinative because what we're asking for is an injunction because of constitutional rights.

The last point I want to just make briefly is opposing counsel has not stated -- I mean, I'm still at a loss. How were the ADA complaints false or deceitful? How were they bogus? What specifically do you contend -- because the things that I've heard so far or seen in the record never went there. That's been rebutted. He was there. He did go there.

"He didn't have a proper intent." Well, that's not consistent with ADA law. It doesn't matter under the CREEC Ninth Circuit opinion.

"Well, the lawyer told us specifically what

10:17AM 5

10:17AM 10

10:17AM 15

10:18AM 20

10:18AM 25

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1
          businesses to go to." I think I heard counsel argue that just
          a few minutes ago. That's not what the evidence says. That's
       2
          not what the record shows.
       3
                     But I will tell Your Honor that, even if that did
       4
          happen -- it didn't. There's no evidence of that here, that he
10:18AM
      5
          was directed about a business to go to or a specific business
       6
       7
          name. That just didn't happen. But even if he did, that's a
       8
          tester case.
                      THE COURT: And I think Mr. Smith conceded that --
10:18AM 10
                     MR. DARNELL: I thought so.
      11
                     THE COURT: -- with my Acme Enterprises
      12
          hypothetical.
                     MR. DARNELL: I thought so. And I'm not aware of
      13
          any case in the Ninth Circuit or any other federal circuit
      14
          dealing with ADA testers that has said that it's fraudulent,
10:19AM 15
      16
          that scenario is fraudulent, that scenario is deceitful, or
      17
          that scenario can never support an ADA standing claim. So,
      18
          apparently, the DA's prosecution is writing novel law or
      19
          proceeding from that basis.
10:19AM 20
                     There's one other legal issue. I heard counsel
      21
          mention the countertop. He never went in. How could he know
      22
          about the countertop? That issue is specifically addressed in
      23
          the reply brief and in the reply declaration from Cornell in
          Docket 34-1.
      2.4
10:19AM 25
                     Mr. Cornell attaches Exhibit 2. And in paragraph 5
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1 of his declaration, he says, "I reviewed the photograph of the 2 interior lobby space of Corona Animal Hospital before I filed the suit. The photograph showed the counter height was too 3 high and would have created an access barrier for Mr. Estrada." 4 As Your Honor undoubtedly knows, Doran vs. 7-Eleven, 10:20AM 5 Ninth Circuit case (2007), an ADA plaintiff, once they 6 7 encounter one barrier, has the right to sue for all barriers, including those discovered through inspection by an expert or 8 discovered by counsel. 10:20AM 10 That is the law in the Ninth Circuit. That's the 11 law in this courtroom. And that is the law that the DA doesn't 12 like and that the DA's prosecution is challenging. There's no question that Mr. Estrada never got to 13 the countertop, that he never got inside. He couldn't. 14 10:21AM 15 was no adequate parking. The first access barrier prevented 16 that. But under Doran vs. 7-Eleven, he has the right and 17 legitimate standing to sue for all access barriers, including 18 that countertop that was discovered by Mr. Cornell before the 19 lawsuit was filed. 10:21AM 20 There is nothing wrong with these ADA cases; there 21 is something wrong with the DA's prosecution. We ask that the 22 Court address that. 23 THE COURT: Thank you. I appreciate that. 24 Mr. Darnell, if I stick with the tentative -- and 10:21AM 25 I'll go back and look at a lot of things and think about this a

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lot more, but if I stick with the tentative, it looked to me
       1
       2
          like I should dismiss the case entirely. I know you don't want
          me to stick with the tentative. But if I do and apply the
       3
          Younger abstention, should I dismiss the case? And let me also
       4
10:22AM
      5
          point out that that would also give you a right to appeal.
                     MR. DARNELL: We would have a right to appeal.
       6
       7
          So --
                     THE COURT: I shouldn't say it gives you that --
       8
          that's not my issue. It may or may not.
10:22AM 10
                                    The appellate issues are inappropriate
                     MR. DARNELL:
          for me to discuss at this stage. Obviously, that should not
      11
      12
          influence the Court's opinion, and I don't think it would. I
      13
          do recognize the procedural status of the case.
      14
                      I think it would be wrong to dismiss, but it's the
10:22AM 15
          same reason why it would be wrong to apply Younger and not
      16
          apply an exception.
      17
                     THE COURT: But the question is if I apply Younger,
      18
          if I deem it appropriate to abstain, should I dismiss the case?
      19
                     MR. DARNELL: My position is no, you should not.
10:23AM 20
          But it's the same reason why you should not abstain. It's
      21
          because the third cause of action is for violation of the ADA
      22
          anti-retaliation statute.
                     THE COURT: Okay. That's kind of where I was going.
      23
      24
                     MR. DARNELL: Abstention means that that statute is
10:23AM 25
          meaningless. Congress created an abrogation. They abrogated.
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1
          They carved this out. That statute is intended to sue states,
       2
          public entities that violate the ADA. By exercising
          abstention, by not applying Younger exception, this Court would
       3
       4
          essentially be rendering that statute meaningless, which is
10:23AM
      5
          another reason why we think abstention is inappropriate.
       6
                      THE COURT: Let me play devil's advocate.
       7
          remedies you seek in the third cause of action are the same
          remedies that we're talking about that you're seeking through
       8
          this motion for preliminary injunction.
10:24AM 10
                     MR. DARNELL: The remedy is injunctive relief under
      11
          the ADA statute, yes.
      12
                      THE COURT: And, specifically, injunctive relief
      13
          pertaining to the criminal prosecution.
                     MR. DARNELL: It's the same remedy, yes, in
      14
10:24AM 15
          application and in law, if I understand the question.
      16
                      THE COURT: So why does the existence of the third
      17
          cause of action counsel against dismissing the entire case if I
      18
          deem Younger abstention applicable?
      19
                     MR. DARNELL: Because -- well, the way the question
10:24AM 20
          is framed, I cannot answer that. My logic is that the third
      21
          cause of action and the federal right that is provided by
      22
          Congress under that cause of action is another reason why
      23
          abstention is inappropriate. But, fundamentally, if you take
      24
          it one step further -- no, I don't think I'm -- let me put it
10:25AM 25
          this way. If the Court exercises abstention, I do not have an
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independent argument for why dismissal is inappropriate.
       1
       2
                      THE COURT: Okay.
                                         Thank you.
                      Mr. Smith, same question. I think I know your
       3
          answer. If I deem Younger abstention appropriate here, should
       4
          I dismiss the case?
10:25AM
      5
                      MR. SMITH: I believe you should, Your Honor.
       6
                                                                      The
       7
          remedy is injunctive relief in the lawsuit. So yes --
                     MR. DARNELL: Your Honor --
       8
                     And I apologize for interrupting.
10:25AM 10
                     MR. SMITH: It's all right.
      11
                      MR. DARNELL: But so we're all operating on the same
      12
          facts, I believe, technically, the remedy that is sought on the
          third and fourth cause of action, they're both under the ADA
      13
          statute injunctive relief and declaratory relief.
      14
                                  So does the existence of the -- so the
10:26AM 15
                      THE COURT:
      16
          existence of the declaratory relief claims/remedy, I think,
      17
          would affect whether I would apply the anti-injunction statute,
      18
          28 U.S.C., Section 2283. But I think Younger abstention is
      19
          broader than that.
10:26AM 20
                      Do you agree with that, Mr. Darnell.
      21
                      MR. DARNELL: I cannot disagree, Your Honor.
      22
                      THE COURT: Okay. So one final question,
      23
          Mr. Darnell. There's been a lot of back-and-forth about the
      24
          evidence that the parties have submitted. The plaintiffs have
10:26AM 25
          submitted evidence that they contend demonstrates that there is
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no criminal violation here, that the prosecution -- criminal prosecution should be abandoned. And, if it's maintained, it will result in acquittal and potential remedies down the road for wrongful criminal prosecution.

The defendant doesn't believe some of the evidence that plaintiffs have submitted. Defendant points to, among other things, Mr. Estrada's statements during his -- the interview, when he may or may not have been arrested, as being particularly damning.

And I acknowledge that plaintiffs challenge the applicability of those statements for a lot of reasons, including Mr. Estrada's health, et cetera. My -- I'll tell you what I'm thinking. I try to be transparent here. The existence of all these disputes of fact, doesn't that counsel in favor of abstention? Shouldn't I allow the criminal prosecution to dig into that? Maybe it will result in a successful demurrer. I don't know. Maybe it won't.

But shouldn't that whole dynamic play out in the state court criminal prosecution case?

MR. DARNELL: No is the short answer. The existence of disputed facts before Your Honor and relating to the core issues is the reason the Court needs to look at them more closely and to evaluate the likelihood of success on the merits; the likelihood that the DA has -- truly has an objectively reasonable belief that their claims are valid and

10:28AM 20

10:27AM

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1
          legitimate; the likelihood that these claims will fit and not
          violate ADA Ninth Circuit precedent.
       2
                      The fact that there's a dispute is the reason the
       3
          Court needs to look more closely at them. It's not a reason to
       4
10:29AM
      5
          abstain or allow this case to be decided by 12 jurors on,
       6
          again, a federal ADA statute, federal standing issue,
       7
          Ninth Circuit complex case law and history, all on which this
          Court is well-versed and understands and has the expertise and
       8
          has been directed by other Ninth Circuit cases to decide in
10:29AM 10
          every ADA case.
      11
                     THE COURT: All right. Thank you.
      12
                     Mr. Smith, did you want to respond to that same
          question? The existence of all disputes of fact, does that not
      13
      14
          counsel in favor of Younger abstention?
10:30AM 15
                     MR. SMITH:
                                  It does, Your Honor. That's why there
      16
          is criminal judges in state courts.
                     THE COURT: Can you get close to the microphone.
      17
      18
                     MR. SMITH: Yeah. I'm sorry, Your Honor. I should
      19
          stand.
10:30AM 20
                     Yeah. No, that's why we do abstain to the state
      21
          courts where these facts can be resolved on these state crimes.
      22
          The defendant has one position in the criminal case; the
      23
          prosecution has the other. Both will present their evidence.
      2.4
          And either a judge or criminal juries can decide.
10:30AM 25
                     THE COURT: All right. Thank you both. I really
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1
          appreciate the robust briefing and your thorough preparation
       2
          and your argument here today. I'm going to take this motion
       3
          under submission. My minute order memorializing this hearing
          will relate that and, also, as I said, grant defendants' motion
       4
10:31AM
      5
          application request to file a sur-reply.
       6
                      What else do we need to accomplish here today?
       7
          Anything else, Mr. Darnell or Mr. Reddy?
       8
                      MR. DARNELL: No, Your Honor. And I appreciate the
       9
          Court's time to allow us to be heard on all of these issues
          today as well as for providing a tentative, which is very
10:31AM 10
      11
          helpful to frame the issues.
      12
                      THE COURT:
                                  Thank you.
      13
                      Mr. Smith, anything else?
                      MR. SMITH: Yeah, likewise. Nothing, Your Honor.
      14
10:31AM 15
          Thank you very much. Thank you for your time and your staff.
      16
                      THE COURT: Thank you. Have a great rest of the day
      17
          and a great weekend.
      18
                        (Proceedings concluded at 10:31 a.m.)
      19
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                     CERTIFICATE OF OFFICIAL REPORTER
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    COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES
    STATE OF CALIFORNIA
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                             )
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                   I, DEBBIE HINO-SPAAN, FEDERAL OFFICIAL REALTIME
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